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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
EDWARDS 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
JOHN EDWARDS, ) Criminal Case No. 041500206 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Appellant Case No. 20040112-CA 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, jurisdiction 
originating with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-2-(2)(i) (1953, as amended), in that it is a conviction of a charge to a first degree 
felony. However, pursuant to order of the Supreme Court dated February 8th, 2005, 
as authorized pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(4) (1953, as 
. ii in .MH It'll), Hit* matter has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whethei m mil Innl coin I unod in denying Appellant's motion 
to suppress or limit failing to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a 
confidential informant prior to the issuance of a search warrant? 
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ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the search warrant obtained after entry into the 
residence was valid? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
evidence on the basis of entrapment under the circumstances of this case as a 
matter of law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to 
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and a standard of "clearly 
erroneous" as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 
and State v. Rhoades. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons. 
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its 
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. 
Comer. 2002 UT App. 219, f l 1, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96, 
1[20, 989 P.2d 52), cert, denied. 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Whether testimony is 
admitted in violation of a defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness, see State v. Calliham. 2002 UT. 87, p i , 57 P.3d 222. 
Generally, if a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, the Court affords 
some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of the law. The measure 
Page 3 of 37 
of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. See 
State v. Hansen. 2002 UT125,1J26,63 P.3d 650. Little discretion is afforded to the 
district court involving issues, such as the reasonableness of search and seizure, 
where there must be statewide standards that guide law enforcement and 
prosecutorial officials, see State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36, lf12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting 
Hansen 2002 UT. 251|26). Where issues on appeal present questions of statutory 
interpretation, the proper interpretation of the statute is a question of law and 
reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1J17,977 P.2d 
1201. The Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal conclusions of the 
trial court but reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, fl8,20 P.3d 
300. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes 
the following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(i) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-(2)(4) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-4 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37(d)-5 (Utah 1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case involving the issues of 
search and seizure and entrapment. The Appellant was arrested in his home for 
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possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, a first degree felony. At the time of 
arrest but after entry into the home by law enforcement, there was issued a search 
warrant of Appellant's apartment. The search warrant relied upon information from 
a confidential informant (C.I. #263) who reported activity that he had observed for 
approximately three (3) weeks while in the home of the Appellant which included 
providing Appellant with precursor substances, in particular, iodine, to make 
methamphetamine. In December, 2004, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence 
on the grounds asserted in this appeal; namely, that the activity of the confidential 
informant was an agent for law enforcement and his entry into Appellant's home 
constituted a warrantless search without exigent circumstances or probable cause, 
that the search warrant was invalid relying upon unsubstantiated, uncorroborated or 
unreliable information from a confidential informant and the exploitation of the 
relationship of the confidential informant to the Appellant by law enforcement was 
of a nature that constituted entrapment as a matter of law. The trial court denied the 
motion to suppress. The Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty on or about 
the 14th day of December, 2004, and was sentenced on or about the 18th day of 
January, 2005. 
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: The Appellant was 
arrested in April, 2004, and a preliminary hearing was held on or about the 5th day 
of May, 2004. The Appellant was bound over on all counts which included 
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possession of a clandestine drug laboratory, a first degree felony; possession of a 
controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, a second degree felony; child 
endangerment, a third degree felony and; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
A misdemeanor. Thereafter, counsel for Appellant withdrew and after qualifying for 
services of the public defender's office, new counsel was appointed. In November, 
2004, points and authorities were provided to the Court in support of Appellant's 
motion to suppress or limit evidence and the State responded in writing. On or about 
December 10th, 2004, an evidentiary hearing was held and testimony was received 
from the confidential informant and from Commander Keith Millet of the Iron/Garfield 
County Narcotics Task Force. 
The Court entered its findings of fact and order denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress or limit on or about the 28th day of December, 2004. The Appellant entered 
his plea on or about the 14th day of December, 2004, and was sentenced on or about 
the 18th day of January, 2005. There was a presentence investigation report 
prepared and the trial court followed the recommendations of the Adult Probation 
and Parole staffing committee, committing the Appellant to the Utah State Prison. 
The Court's judgment, sentence and commitment was entered on or about the 27th 
day of January, 2005. The Appellant filed his notice of appeal and request for 
transcript on or about the 1st day of February, 2005. 
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STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. On or about the 7th day of April, 2004, the Appellant was arrested at his 
residence at 364 V* South 100 West, Cedar City, Iron County, Utah, for possession 
of a clandestine drug laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of title 58, chapter 
37(d), sections 4(d) and 5(d)(e)(f), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and 
other related charges. See the Record at pages 2 and 3. The other charges 
included unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, 
endangerment of a child, a third degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. 
2. At the time of arrest but after entry into Appellant's home by law 
enforcement or its agent, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search of 
Appellant's apartment. See the Record at pages 21 and 22; see also a copy 
hereafter attached at Addendum as Exhibit A. The search warrant is supported by 
the affidavit of Officer Millet. See the record at pages 23 to 28; see also a copy 
hereof attached at Addendum as Exhibit B. The search warrant relies only upon the 
information provided by the confidential informant and on its face shows no basis for 
corroboration or independent verification. The Affidavit sets forth that the 
confidential informant had in fact been working as a confidential informant for law 
enforcement for approximately three (3) weeks prior to the date of affidavit. Id. at j|4. 
The confidential informant at the evidentiary hearing in December, 2004, testified 
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that he had entered into an agreement with the Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task 
Force to avoid prosecution on an order to show cause for violating his terms of 
parole. See the evidentiary hearing transcript at page 9. The confidential informant 
was pressured into pulling his end of the deal. Id. The confidential informant 
marked the Appellant as one involved in the activity, not based on observation of 
criminal activity but from a hunch or suspicion. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, the 
confidential informant testified as follows: 
Q. I see. When you say pressured, was this pressure in the form of 
having to go back and face the allegations of the probation or was there 
anything additional in terms of pressure that was - -
A. The pressure of losing my freedom. 
Q. I see. So, basically, either perform on your original agreement or 
else we were going to go ahead with the allegations on the probation 
violation? 
A. Similar to that, except for they asked me, what can you do for us? 
Do you know anybody? 
Q. Okay. In the context of that, you meant Mr. Edwards. Now, what 
leads you to believe that Mr. Edwards might be involved in this activity? 
A. At one point in time in my life I was in pretty much the same 
business as he was as far as manufacturing methamphetamine. So, 
you know, I wasn't made naive to the type of individual or the way the 
individual carries themselves or the way the individual talks about their 
product. 
Q. I see. And, in this particular case, you had conversations with Mr. 
Edwards along those lines? 
A. Not yet. 
Q. Okay. So, now, after meeting Mr. Edwards what leads you to the 
next step? Did you report this information to Mr. Millet? 
A. Well, I had - - I had known, I knew what - - what - - what John 
Edwards was doing. I had a pretty good idea. Like I say, you are not 
blind to it. But in the position I was, I felt that with my background I 
could step into his world and accomplish what I needed to accomplish 
to better myself. Id. at pages 10 and 11. 
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3. The confidential informant goes on to state that he targeted Mr. Edwards 
and provided him materials such as glassware and iodine. Id at pages 11 and 12. 
On further examination, the confidential informant disclosed that he and the Appellant 
were both part of the Southern California "Peckerwoods" which does not proclaim 
to be a gang but is involved with similar activities requiring a show of loyalty or 
allegiance. Id at pages 23 and 26. The trial court denied the Appellant's motion to 
suppress or limit issued its order, see the Record at pages 184 to 186 and 250 to 
253; see also a copy of the Court's order and findings is attached hereto at 
Addendum as Exhibit C. The matter was placed back on the Court's calendar for 
status, on the 14th day of December, 2004. The Appellant entered a conditional plea 
to count I, possession of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, as part of the 
plea agreement which also contemplated dismissal of the remaining counts and on 
January 18th, 2005, see the Record at pages 238 to 246; see also a copy at 
Addendum attached as Exhibit D, the Appellant was sentenced per statute see the 
Record at pages 266 to 269; see also a copy at Addendum attached as Exhibit E. 
The plea agreement was a conditional plea preserving the issues regarding the trial 
court's ruling and order on the motion to suppress or limit. Notice of Appeal was 
filed on or about the 1st day of February, 2005, and the matter was assigned by the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about the 8th day of 
February, 2005. See the Record at page 274. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress or limit, failing 
to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a confidential informant working 
with the local task force to avoid prosecution on his probation violation and where 
he was left to his own devices to set up the Appellant as a target for investigation 
and then provided Appellant with equipment and the precursor substance on which 
the Appellant was ultimately charged, possession of a clandestine drug laboratory. 
The informant entered Appellant's home as an agent of law enforcement and 
gathered the information upon which the State primarily, but without corroboration 
or independent verification, relied in supporting its request for a warrant to search 
Appellant's residence. The Appellant argues that the matter is one calling for the 
need to establish uniform standards in the use of confidential informants by law 
enforcement consistent with other law enforcement practices and proceedings and 
recognizing that warrantless entry into the residence of a private citizen without 
exigent circumstances and probable cause is a per se violation of the right to privacy 
and grounds to suppress or limit the State's evidence. 
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B. 
The search warrant was obtained after entry was made into the residence of 
the Appellant by the confidential informant who had been working with the local task 
force for several weeks and had targeted the Appellant as a suspect based on a 
hunch and not supported by the results of prior law enforcement investigation. The 
supporting affidavit is defective in that it fails to set forth a basis for corroboration or 
independent verification and the circumstances and credibility of the confidential 
informant are both questionable. Moreover, the information submitted in the affidavit 
to establish reliability is false. The fact that the confidential informant was working 
while on parole or when there was pending allegations of parole violation or that the 
confidential informant supplied materials and equipment to the Appellant whose 
residence was to be searched was not disclosed to the magistrate issuing the 
warrant. The trial court missed the point and failed to see the need for independent 
verification to support issuance of the warrant. The case demonstrates how 
confidential informants being utilized, as a rogue agent, not subject to the same 
standards, rule or regulations as other law enforcement agents. It shows the need 
for state-wide uniform standards. 
C. 
The trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence on the grounds of 
entrapment, the State expecting the relationship between the confidential informant 
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and the Appellant concerning their mutual participation in the "Peckerwoods" and 
because of the confidential informant's involvement in providing essential equipment 
and ingredients, iodine, enabling the Appellant to commit the offense. There was no 
evidence of prior criminal activity. The Appellant was targeted because of his 
involvement with the Southern California "Peckerwoods", a white supremacist 
organization which was organized within the California prison system. Being called 
to participated in a criminal enterprise by a fellow Peckerwood was more then 
providing an opportunity but was an active inducement designed to lure the 
Appellant into the commission of the offense. Moreover, the confidential informant 
provided glassware and iodine enabling the Appellant to possess a clandestine drug 
laboratory. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS OR LIMIT. FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
THROUGH THE USE OF A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PRIOR TO THE 
ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT WHERE IT INVOLVED ENTRY INTO 
APPELLANT'S RESIDENCE. 
Appellant sees this issue as one requiring uniform state-wide standards to 
guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. In State v. Hansen. 2002 UT125, 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue involving search and seizure but 
within the scope of a traffic stop and as part of its analysis addressed the standard 
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of review stating quite appropriately that in cases involving mixed questions of fact 
and law the Court should afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's 
application of the law and that this measure of discretion varies according to the 
issue reviewed. The Court then stated: 
When a case involves consent to a search, we afford little discretion to 
the district court, because there must be 'state-wide standards that 
guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.' Id at paragraph 26; 
see also State v. Truman. 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah, 1993). 
The Court went on to state that state-wide standards help in ensure different trial 
judges will reach the same legal conclusion in cases that have little factual 
difference. In that case, the Court concluded in its analysis that because the case 
involved the legality of the search and seizure, the district's court determination of 
law should not have been afforded deference by the Court of Appeals. Id. 
The Appellant maintains that the same standard should be applied to the 
circumstances in the present case where there exists, if anything, a heightened 
concern in that the search and seizure involves a warrantless search of the 
residence of Appellant. This same standard has been applied to similar 
circumstances. For instance, in State v. Warren. 2003, UT 36, the Utah Supreme 
Court applied the standard to a Terry Frisk circumstance which in comparison to the 
present case seems to Appellant to be one of lessor compelling interest but 
nevertheless in that case stating as follows: 
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When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we 
afford little discretion to the district court because there must be state-
wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials 
(citations omitted). Id at paragraph 12. 
The Supreme Court again expressed its reason for implementing state-wide 
standards as that of insuring different trial judges to reach the same legal conclusion 
in cases with little factual difference. 
In the instant case, there is no question that the transactions between the 
confidential informant and the Appellant occurred after the confidential informant's 
arrangement with the drug task force, in the home of Appellant and prior to acquiring 
any type of warrant to enter upon the premises. In the affidavit setting forth the basis 
for obtaining the warrant, the commander of the task force acknowledged that the 
confidential informant was acting as an agent for three (3) weeks prior to the date 
of the affidavit. Stated another way, the circumstances in the present case involve 
the issue of warrantless search of the residence of the Appellant. 
A warrantless search is a perse Fourth Amendment violation unless the State 
can establish one of the "few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions." See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357,88 S.Ct. 507, 514,19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (further 
citations omitted)). The use of a confidential informant as an agent in entering the 
residence of a private citizen has never been recognized as one of the established 
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and well delineated exceptions. In fact, the trend is to protect the citizens' 
expectancy of privacy. For instance, in State v. Beavers. 857 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 
1993), the Utah Court of Appeals conducted its assessment of a warrantless entry 
as follows: 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons and houses ... against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." When police make a seizure, Fourth Amendment 
analysis begins with an assessment of whether the seizure occurred in 
a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See 
State v.Brown. 853 P.2d 851,855 (Utah 1992).... Physical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed, see United States v. United States District 
Court. 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed. 2d 752 
(1972). Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures within a 
home or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances. (Citations omitted). Absent exigent circumstances, the 
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. See 
Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573.590.100 S.Ct. 1371.1380.63 L.Ed. 
2d 639 (1980). (Emphasis added). 
This Court in Beavers went on to clarify that the State bears a particularly 
heavy burden of proving that the warrantless entry into a home falls within 
established exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the 
context of the hot pursuit exception, this Court went on to state what it believed to 
be the general rule, that a warrantless entry of a private residence must be qualified 
"by probable cause and exigent circumstances". Id at 15 (emphasis in original). In 
the instant case, a search warrant was obtained incident to the arrest of the 
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Appellant. However, the issue is whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of the 
information provided through the use of the confidential informant. At the evidentiary 
hearing, it was clear the information relied upon by the commander of the task force 
to request the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant used information obtained 
solely from the confidential informant while in the home of the Appellant without a 
warrant. Without the information obtained by the confidential informant, there would 
never have been established a basis for the warrant. Notwithstanding the 
information provided by the confidential informant in supporting the warrant, there 
was never established an independent source corroborating the information upon 
which the magistrate might have relied in finding probable cause for its issuance. 
Where evidence is obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure, in this case 
evidence secured after obtaining an invalid warrant, there is no alternative but 
suppress the evidence. As articulated by Chief Justice Durham in State v. Larocko. 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) where she states: 
The principle of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful search and 
seizure should not be admitted at trial was not adopted until relatively 
recent times in Utah ... we now expressly hold that exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence as a necessary consequence of police violations of 
Article I, Section 14. Id at 472. 
In that case, the activity mandating suppression of the evidence was nothing 
more than to open an unlocked car door to find the vehicle identification number 
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when the officer had good reason to suspect that the car had been stolen. The 
Court reasoned, which interestingly is no different in the present case, that since the 
officer could have easily obtained a warrant for the search of the car, simply opening 
the door to inspect the vehicle identification number constituted an unreasonable 
search under Utah law. The action taken in the instant case is far more pervasive. 
The Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force went to the trouble of arranging for the 
availability of a confidential informant, a person associated with the Appellant in 
activities that might make him succumb to appeals to produce methamphetamine. 
The task force, through the confidential informant provided the Appellant with an 
essential precursor substance in the making of methamphetamine and exploited the 
Appellant's relationship and association with a certain group with which the 
confidential informant was also affiliated to get Appellant to set up the clandestine 
drug laboratory. While the task force had the opportunity and means to monitor and 
control the activities of their informant through the use of electronic surveillance or 
visual observation, the confidential informant in this case is left to his own devices 
to involve the Appellant in criminal enterprise. 
If the narcotics task force had utilized any other means of surveillance to 
obtain the same information such as an enhanced listening device to monitor 
activities within the home of the Appellant, the requirement of a warrant would be 
clear and obvious. Such amplified electronic surveillance techniques are not 
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typically condoned unless a warrant has been secured prior to their implementation. 
The present circumstance is no different except instead of amplified electronic 
surveillance the technique utilized is an individual acting as a confidential informant. 
In short, the use of the confidential informant amounts to nothing more than a 
creative extension of a surveillance technique, monitoring or investigating the 
activities of a private citizen within the confines of his own home and calls into 
question a violation of the fundamental Fourth Amendment protections against 
unlawful search and seizure. 
Most district court judges choose to address this matter not in the context of 
unwarranted surveillance but rather as an issue involving whether or not the 
confidential informant is an agent of the government. Appellant believes the agency 
argument confuses the basic concern without addressing the real issue. An 
example of this might be noted in the case of State v. Koury. 824 P.2d 474 (Ut. App. 
1991). In that case, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of when a private 
individual acts as an agent of the government in conducting a search and/or seizure, 
stating that the search is a governmental act and must comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, see also The United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109,113,104 S.Ct. 
1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed. 2d 85 (1984), and Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In Koury. this Court stated that the government cannot use informants to do 
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for them what they cannot legally do themselves; see also State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 
1219, 1220, (Utah 1988). This Court went on to state the when it believes the 
person's intended purpose for being in the residence is to perpetuate the interests 
of law enforcement rather than preserve his own personal interest, then the person 
is unquestionably an agent for the State. This leads to an inference that when there 
is no recognized exception, a warrant is required to enter another's home if it is part 
of a police investigation. The Court in that case made it clear that law enforcement 
cannot create its own exigent circumstance in order to justify its warrantless entry; 
see also State v. Munoz Giarra. 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cfr. 1986). This is nothing more 
than attenuation. That is, even if a search is conducted pursuant to a recognized 
exception to the per se rule, it may still be invalid because it was obtained by law 
enforcement's exploitation of a prior illegality. See State v. Hamm. 910 P.2d 433 
(Ut. App. 1996); see also State v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, (Ut. App.) cert, granted, 
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). Can there really be any question that the activity of the 
confidential informant for the Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force prior to 
obtaining the search warrant constitutes an intrusion into the Appellant's home that 
violates the Appellant's right to privacy. Such intrusion mandates that the matter be 
analyzed in the context of a warrantless search with a presumption of illegality 
unless the Court finds that the officers had both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances justifying their intrusion. While permission can generally be 
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considered as an exigent circumstance, the law is clear that it should not apply in 
this case because the permissive circumstance is a part of the governmental 
agency's investigation and use as agent a confidential informant. That is, the 
utilization of some type of monitoring technique that projects the agency into the 
home of the Appellant in contravention of Appellant's right to privacy. In other words, 
law enforcement created the circumstance under which it justifies its warrantless 
entry. 
More importantly, where is the probable cause? The confidential informant 
testifying at the evidentiary hearing at the motion to suppress clearly stated that at 
the time the Appellant was marked as a target, he had no evidence which was the 
result of observation but a hunch or suspicion of Appellant's illegal or unlawful 
activity. Under such circumstances, the confidential informant provided one of the 
ingredients to make the methamphetamine, iodine, a precursor element, and 
provided glassware for the laboratory. There is no evidence of prior criminal activity. 
Law enforcement had no report of illegal activity but relied entirely upon that hunch 
of their agent. If there ever was a circumstance that confounds the very basis for 
having constitutional protection, this case marks that concern with exclamation. It 
affords the circumstance proclaiming the need to adopt state-wide uniform standards 
for law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities in their use of confidential 
informants. The effect of validating such law enforcement activity turns the 
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fundamental principles of protection and privacy into a charade and seems to afford 
greater protections to circumstances involving a Terry Frisk search or a traffic stop 
inquiry than to activity within the residence of a private citizen. This is not a 
circumstance where activities were viewed in a person's yard or under 
circumstances which might otherwise be considered in plain view. This situation 
occurred within the confines of the Appellant's home and is brought his doorstep by 
the activities of law enforcement in targeting him through the use of a confidential 
informant based upon a hunch. 
The nature and use of the confidential informant in this particular context is 
also of a character and kind that cries out for some sort of scrutiny. It is because 
there has been a concern for reliability and also for the credibility of confidential 
informants in general that the procedures of use have normally involved observation, 
monitoring and control. In the typical situation, the confidential informant is often 
searched just prior to being wired and sent into a controlled buy environment and 
then he is searched again afterwards. The operation is typically visually observed 
by another part of the team and a wire is placed on him to insure that he does not 
say or do the wrong thing. In other words, the activities of the confidential informant 
are monitored, recorded and controlled because the fundamental premise is that a 
confidential informant should not otherwise be left to his own devices. However, in 
the instance case, the confidential informant is given what amounts to a cart blanche 
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to go out and find somebody. While the task force has the ability to monitor the 
operation and to keep the confidential informant in check, the effort in the instant 
case seems to be to turn a blind eye to allow the confidential informant to act on his 
own, more or less as rogue agent, to set up who he will in whatever circumstance 
might come to him and then to report back to the task force when he has something 
useful. It is Appellant's contention that this is an open invitation for corruption and 
manipulation. This flies in the face of established procedures and controls that have 
been the justification for utilizing this type of law enforcement technique. Moreover, 
it unreasonably puts the public directly at risk by exposing it to the unchecked 
activities of individuals who have in the past exhibited a propensity toward criminal 
activity to work the system to their benefit often in blatant disregard to rules, laws 
and procedures to which law enforcement would otherwise be subjected. Moreover, 
there is simply no uniformity in operation from one community to the next. What 
might be an accepted practice and basis for understanding in one district will vary 
substantially and completely in the next county, community or before a different 
judge. If there was ever a case that seemed to cry out for a need of uniform and 
state-wide standards and procedures, the use of confidential informants is one for 
which there is an overwhelming concern. Appellant in the instant case believes that 
whatever basis or uniformity is established, the minimum standard would require that 
when such activities are directed toward investigation into the residence of a private 
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citizen, there would be a minimum requirement of a search warrant being secured 
prior to entry. 
B. 
THE SEARCH WARRANT OBTAINED AFTER ENTRY INTO APPELLANT'S 
RESIDENCE WAS INVALID AND THEREFORE EVIDENCE SEIZED UNDER 
THE WARRANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED OR LIMITED. 
At or about the time of the arrest of the Appellant, there was a search warrant 
issued for the search of the residence of the Appellant. The same was supported 
by the affidavit of the commander of the Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force, 
Keith Millet. See the Record at pages 23 to 28, see also a copy thereof attached at 
Addendum as Exhibit B. The affidavit sets forth eight (8) paragraphs upon which the 
affiant relies to establish probable cause that a search warrant should be issued. 
Close examination of the paragraphs shows that the information relied upon to justify 
the issuance of the warrant amounted to the experience and training of Commander 
Millet, in excess of fourteen (14) years, spending two and half (2 %) years with the 
task force and having attended training classes related to detection and 
investigation. Id. Commander Millet indicates he was a graduate from the United 
States Drug Enforcement Agency School on clandestine laboratory investigation and 
the Clandestine Laboratory Investigators Academy which apparently teach law 
enforcement agents to detect methamphetamine production. Commander Millet 
further states that he deals with methamphetamine almost on a daily basis. Id. 
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Commander Millet goes on to state, without disclosing the identity of the 
informant, that the same has provided on previous occasions reliable information 
leading to the arrest of an undisclosed suspect indicating that the same occurred in 
2003. Id at fl 2. Stating specifically, Commander indicated that the confidential 
informant conducted two (2) "controlled buys" wherein the confidential informant was 
wired with an electronic transmitting device and given task force money to complete 
the transactions. Id. The informant arranged transactions and then followed through 
under the surveillance and supervision of the task force officers. Each time the 
information provided by the confidential informant proved reliable and the 
methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect. Id. It is set forth in the affidavit 
that the confidential informant had met with the Appellant and that they were 
associated with a group called the "Peckerwoods" and had built a relationship of 
trust through that association. Id. at page fl 3. It stated that the confidential 
informant had been reporting to the commander of the task force for three (3) weeks 
that the Appellant was manufacturing methamphetamine and that he has viewed 
ingredients and glassware common to the production of methamphetamine. Id. The 
commander indicated that it was reported to him by the confidential informant that 
on the same day at approximately 3:00 p.m., the confidential informant viewed the 
Appellant in the process of cooking methamphetamine. Id at U 5. The commander, 
the affiant, then asserted that the Appellant had the chemicals and laboratory 
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equipment to produce methamphetamine and further indicated the Appellant uses 
a shed behind the residence to store chemicals in the production of 
methamphetamine. Id. 
Although the paragraphs are worded in such a way as to cloud the 
understanding of that which is being stated, it is clear that the reporting information 
comes solely from the confidential informant and the judgment based upon the 
experience, training and understanding of the commander of the task force. There 
is not stated in the affidavit any information suggesting that the information provided 
by the confidential informant was corroborated through an independent source or 
that the information was corroborated through observation or surveillance by the task 
force. The only attempts made by the commander to corroborate the information of 
the confidential informant was that the confidential informant had previously provided 
information to the task force which proved to be reliable and led to the arrest of a 
particular suspect the task force had been monitoring. That allegation proved to be 
false. When asked about prior association the confidential informant at the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress made mention of the fact that he had 
only been working with the task for the three (3) months and that his one and only 
prior involvement fell through. In fact, this became the reason why the task force 
was pressuring him to come up with something. In pertinent part the confidential 
informant stated as follows: 
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Q. Can you give us some idea how you came to be associated with Mr. 
Edwards? 
A. Well, I went over to a mutual friend, I would say, and met him for the 
first time there. 
Q. Can you tell us about when this was at? 
A. Hmm, I'm not quite sure of the date. I'm not prepared to answer a 
question knowing dates like that. I'm sorry. 
Q. Okay. Well, just give a general idea of about when that was at. 
A. Oh, maybe a month and a half before he got incarcerated. 
Q. I see. So you are familiar with the time period about a month in half 
before he was incarcerated, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. When did you first start associating with Mr. // Officer Millet 
of the Utah // Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force? 
A. Oh, probably about three (3) months prior to that. 
Q. I see. So, you have been working with the task force prior to 
meeting Mr. Edwards? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. In what capacity were you working with the task force? 
A. I had compromised my parole. I had made an agreement to - - to 
work with them on another individual who was doing sales of 
methamphetamines. And the agreement was that if I made a sale on 
her, I got her meth manufacture, that I was - - I would be able to 
straighten myself without with AP&P. 
Q. I see. In terms of straightening yourself out, basically, what the 
essence of that would be is that violations your parole would dismissed 
or discharged in some capacity? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Is this agreement that you entered into, was this prior to meeting 
Mr. Edwards? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And so, was Mr. Edwards the name was disclosed as being a 
potential supplier of this woman that you were involved in attempting? 
A. No. No, they had never met. 
Q. Had did you come to get involved with Mr. Edwards. 
A. Well, I had - - like I said, I was at mutual acquaintance of ours being 
social. And before I was put into the position, you see, I had neglected 
to take on the second responsibility, therefore, it dissipated. There was 
no way that I could get near the individual so I was kind of pressured to 
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pull my end of the deal. And, at one point, I had no choice but to come 
with something. 
Q. I see. Then when you say pressured, was this pressure in the form 
of having to go back and face the allegations of the probation or was 
there anything additional in terms of pressure that was - -
A. The pressure of losing my freedom. 
Q. I see. So basically, either perform on your original agreement or 
else you were going to go ahead with the allegations on the probation 
violation? 
A. Similar to that, except for they asked me, what can you do for us? 
Do you know anybody? 
Q. Okay. In the context of that, you met Mr. Edwards. Now, what 
leads you to believe that Mr. Edwards might be involved in this activity? 
A. At one point in time in my life I was in pretty much the same 
business as he was as far as manufacturing methamphetamines. So 
you know, I wasn't naive to the type of individual or the way an 
individual carries themselves or the way the individual talks about their 
product. 
Q. I see. And, in this particular case, you had conversations with Mr. 
Edwards along those lines? 
A. Not yet. 
Q. Okay. So, now, after meeting Mr. Edwards what leads to the next 
step? Did you report this information to Mr. Millet? 
A. Well, I had - -1 had known, I knew what - - what - - Mr. Edwards was 
doing. I had a pretty good idea. Like I say, I was not blind to it. But in 
the position I was, I felt that with my background I could step into his 
world and accomplish what I needed to accomplish to better myself. 
Q. I see. And so what did you do? 
A. I targeted him. 
See evidentiary hearing transcript at pages 8 through 11. 
When this information is compared to the allegations that were submitted to 
the magistrate to secure the warrant it is clear that the information provided to the 
magistrate was false. Moreover, the information is unreliable and not credible in that 
there was no prior occasion to believe that the confidential informant's information 
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would be reliable. However, the most important defect in the affidavit and the 
supporting material to the warrant is that it was neither corroborated nor verified by 
an independent source or any other means. In essence, all the task force has is the 
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated information provided by a confidential informant 
who had not previously provided reliable information and was under pressure to 
come up with somebody to keep from having to go back and face the allegations of 
a pending order to show cause or probation violation. There is nothing that confirms 
to the magistrate that the information is credible or reliable. 
Obviously, the trial court was concerned about those issues and attempted to 
make findings regarding three (3) deficiencies in a search warrant presented for the 
judge's signature on April 7th, 2004, and concluding that such deficiencies would not 
have changed his decision in finding probable cause to conduct a search. See 
paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the trial court's findings of fact and order denying 
Appellant's motion to suppress, at Addendum Exhibit C. 
The trial court determined that it was sufficient corroboration since the 
confidential informant kept Commander Millet apprized of his activities and because 
Appellant had laboratory equipment in his home and was in the process of preparing 
to cook methamphetamine. To state it another way, the trial court missed the point 
in that it failed to see that if the issue is credibility and reliability of the confidential 
informant, more or additional information coming only from the confidential informant 
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is not verified or confirmed through an independent source does not make the 
information more reliable. Hence, the reason why the warrant should not have been 
issued and was invalid is that it failed to establish probable cause. Corroboration 
after the fact in finding laboratory equipment in the Appellant's home, does not justify 
the issuance of the warrant where there is no probable cause established prior to 
entry. 
The Appellant asserts that there should be some distinction made between the 
circumstances in this case involving a confidential informant whose not only on 
parole for having committed a crime but also operating under the pressure and 
circumstance of being found in violation of his conditions of parole as opposed to a 
public citizen who might be volunteering information out of some sense of civic duty 
to report suspicious looking criminal behavior but otherwise having no alterier motive 
or reason for making such disclosure. Compare State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1997) and State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992). 
Again, the problem seems to be in the use of the confidential informant. The 
Appellant sees this as another strong indication for some type of state-wide 
standards to establish the use of confidential informants in a way not in 
contravention of fundamental principles of procedure regarding search and seizure. 
To the Appellant, the basis upon which the task force relied in order to substantiate 
a search warrant of the Appellant's residence, only shows to what extreme any task 
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force will go in using confidential informants as their tool of investigation without 
seeking a warrant. Had the information been fairly and accurately provided to the 
magistrate and not mischaracterized as it had, it would have disclosed to the 
magistrate that the confidential informant was on parole and had violated the terms 
of his parole and had worked out an arrangement with the task force to keep from 
going back to prison. The confidential informant had not previously worked with the 
task force in a successful arrest, conviction or apprehension of any suspect. The 
information establishing the contact with the confidential informant was based upon 
the confidential informant's suspicion or hunch and unsupported by any 
independently verified source or supervised operation. The confidential informant 
had provided the suspect and owner of the residence for which the search warrant 
was being obtained, materials and equipment involved in methamphetamine 
manufacturing such as iodine and glassware and the confidential informant was not 
supervised or acting under the control or direction of the task force. 
Given those actual facts, which came to light through the course of the 
proceedings, it is very unlikely that a reasonable magistrate would have believed that 
the information was sufficiently reliable to justify the issuance of a warrant to search 
a private residence. Given those circumstances and looking at the matter in 
hindsight, the district court did not make the matter any more reliable by attempting 
to make findings and conclusions that fly in the face of the judgment of a reasonable 
Page 30 of 37 
magistrate. Given the fact that the magistrate in this case is the same judge that 
reviewed the circumstances, it is simply self serving and does nothing to make the 
decision of the trial court to deny indifferential for purposes of this Court's review. 
Under the circumstances, the Appellant asserts that the proper course is to 
determine the warrant invalid and suppress the evidence acquired through its use 
or limit the same as it deems appropriate and remand to proceed accordingly. 
C. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE ON 
GROUNDS OF ENTRAPMENT. THE STATE EXPLOITING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND THE 
APPELLANT CONCERNING THEIR MUTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
"PECKERWOODS" AND BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S 
INVOLVEMENT IN PROVIDING ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AND INGREDIENTS 
ENABLING THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE. 
In Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1) (1953, as amended) the basis 
for the entrapment defense is set forth statutorily. The statute focuses on conduct 
of law enforcement, by and through its agents, not necessarily the conduct of the 
offender. See State v. Belt. 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1989). The Utah Supreme 
Court has found entrapment where the State exploits a close personal relationship 
involving inducement by a persistent request, see State v. Courbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 
(Utah 1980) and State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). In State v. Spraaue. 
680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court found entrapment where a 
defendant sold marijuana after persistent request by an undercover agent where the 
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agent first approached the defendant with no prior knowledge that he was involved 
in drugs and where the defendant testified that he made the sale in order to be a 
friend to the police officer. It is obvious that the Court in that case saw more to the 
arrangement than simply the words exchanged or the dialogue between the parties. 
The relationship of the parties to each other and the expectations that the parties 
involved are factors that can and should be considered. Nevertheless, the standard 
is clearly whether the inducement would be effective to persuade a reasonable 
person to commit an offense not just afford such a person the opportunity to do so. 
This is clearly a situation that is by and large subject to the facts and circumstances 
of each particular case. That being said, however, this Appellant believes that there 
are some areas of exploitation that are so clear and obvious that as a matter of law 
entrapment should be found since the same create such a substantial risk that an 
offense would be committed that there is no reason to afford deferential 
consideration given minor factual distinctions between cases. Again, the Appellant 
believes that this is another indication as to why clear standards should be 
established in the practice and procedure for utilizing confidential informants. In the 
instance case, the confidential informant and the Appellant were members of a 
California white supremacist organization known as the "Peckerwoods" which was 
originated in the California prison system. Although the confidential informant was 
quick to say that the organization is not gang related per se, it is one that is notorious 
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for priding itself on its exclusivity and for having its members test their loyalty or 
allegiance by performing acts that might otherwise be construed as a show of poor 
judgment or illegality. The Appellant believes that the reason why the confidential 
informant in this case was so confident in informing the commander of the 
Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force that the Appellant would be a good target 
without having any knowledge of past criminal history of the Appellant, was not 
because of his hunch or suspicion but because he was aware that Appellant was a 
member of the "Peckerwoods" in California. In other words, this was more than a 
simple association between two (2) people with a common background, possibly 
even coming from the same neighborhood. What was called upon by the Appellant 
was a request coming from a fellow "Peckerwood" to involve himself in criminal 
activity. Without necessarily condoning the Appellant's action in succumbing to the 
demands and requests made by the confidential informant, the focus of entrapment 
is on the agent's use of this relationship coupled with his own involvement in 
providing substances to the Appellant to enable the Appellant to participate in the 
criminal enterprise. There is no evidence in this case that the Appellant was 
disposed to commit the criminal activity without the involvement of the confidential 
informant. In fact, the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing conceded that they had 
no prior independent information of the Appellant's involvement in any such criminal 
activity. This criminal action was initiated by the inducement of the confidential 
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informant based upon that person's hunch or suspicion as he stated at the 
evidentiary hearing. In Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
Officers of government may afford opportunities to commit crime by and 
employing artifice and stratagems to apprehend persons engaged in 
criminal enterprise. However, they cannot implant in the mind of an 
innocent person the disposition to commit the offense and induce its 
commission in order to prosecute. 
Stated another way, the focus is not the Appellant's propensity or 
predisposition as much as it is upon law enforcement's conduct in their proper use 
of governmental power. As stated in that case, the question becomes whether or 
not the conduct of the government comports with a fair and honorable administration 
of justice. This approach specifically denies the use of decoys (such as in the 
situation in the instant case) to present active inducements for the purpose of luring 
a person into a commission of an offense. The government is not permitted to 
engage in the manufacture of a crime. The prime duty of law enforcement is the 
prevention of crime through the apprehension of those persons who, without 
inducement are engaged in the commission of criminal activity. Exploiting the 
relationship of an individual's association with an extreme group such as the 
"Peckerwoods", providing equipment and essential ingredients for the production of 
methamphetamine, by the confidential informant is clearly engaging in the 
manufacture of criminal activity. The fact that the confidential informant was 
providing not just material to the Appellant but one of the essential precursor 
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elements is a strong factor in considering the issue of enablement. Simply put, 
without the confidential informant providing iodine in this case, there is no way that 
the Appellant could have manufactured methamphetamine and without this particular 
precursor element, the other items found within Appellant's home constituting the 
laboratory would be insufficient to find the Appellant in possession of a clandestine 
drug laboratory because there were no other precursor elements found at the 
residence. 
However, clearly the most offensive aspect to the circumstances and events 
that transpired and led to the arrest of the Appellant in this case is again the fact that 
the action of the confidential informant in this particular case was unchecked, 
unsupervised and out of control. The confidential informant is simply allowed to go 
out and set up the situation as he chooses without authority, direction or mandate 
from the task force. In short, he is allowed to participate in a criminal enterprise and 
then exonerate himself from all participation or activity by exposing the project that 
he helped set up. In fact, such project would not have come into existence without 
his participation. This is clearly entrapment as a matter of law but more importantly 
demonstrates another circumstance as to why well defined standards need to be set 
in the use and operation of confidential informants which are uniform throughout the 
State of Utah and consistent with other jurisdictions. How can the use of such 
questionable investigative practices be condoned or tolerated without accepted rules 
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or standards upon which to operate. If this case highlights anything it is the reality 
that the use of confidential informants as a part of law enforcement practices cannot 
go unchecked, uncontrolled or unsupervised and that standards and practices 
should be established consistent with all other areas of law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests 
judgment in his favor reversing or remanding as the Court deems appropriate 
together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this (j? day of 
J. BRYAN |JACKSON, 
Attorney lor Appellant Edwards 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Commander Keith 
Millett, of the Iron/Garfield Narcotics Task Force, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to 
believe that the crimes of Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and 
Production/Manufacture of Methamphetamine, have been committed by John Edwards and that there 
is evidence in the Edward's home, the white storage shed in the back yard, and the grey 2000 Audi, 
related to the crimes of Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and 
Production/Manufacture of Methamphetamine, that are incriminating and that are supported by the 
affidavit in support of thjs search warrant and that 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
The controlled substance methamphetamine, together with 
0022 
methamphetamine laboratory equipment (glassware, ephedrine, red 
phosphorous and iodine); and solvents and other chemicals used in 
the production of methamphetamine (coleman fuel, red-devil lye, and 
sulphuric acid); and records, notes, and papers related to the 
production or manufacturing of methamphetamine; and drug 
paraphernalia. 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being possessed 
with a purpose to use as a means of committing or concealing a public offense, and/or consists of 
an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the daytime or nighttime, with the 
requirement of knocking and announcing the presence of law enforcement officersf and with the ^ J ^ j * 
requirement that any evidence retrieved as described in the affidavit in support of this warrant being 
delivered the Fifth Judicial Justice Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah, or that the property 
be retained in the possession of the Iron/Garfield Narcotics Task Force, and a inventory list be 
provided to the aforementioned court. 
Given under my hand this / day of April, 2004, at the hour of r~; > /^.m. 
BY THE COURT: 
*G. MJ^RA^L WESTFALL 
District Court Judge 
0021 
Exhibit B 
*rizr 
m THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH ' 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT , «i / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
Before the Honorable G. Michael Westfall, Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah: 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
That your affiant, Keith Millett, is the Commander of the Iron\Garfield Counties 
Narcotics Task Force (ICGNTF) and has been a peace officer for in excess of 14 years and has 
reason to believe the following, to wit: 
That within the residence known as the John Edwards residence, located at 364 Vi South 
100 West, Cedar City, Utah, your affiant believes there is evidence of drug activity, including the 
manufacture of a controlled substance. Said residence is more particularly described as a white 
rambler style home with brown trim and an apartment downstairs wherein Mr. Edwards resides. 
The number 364 is affixed to the front of the home, which faces East and there is a large pine tree 
located in the front yard. Access to the basement apartment is on the south side of the residence 
with a set of stairs leading down to the door. A photograph of the home is attached hereto and 
incorporated by this reference. Next to the home is a white shed (the only shed on the premises) 
located on the north-west corner of the property in the back yard. John Edwards has access to 
store items in the shed pursuant to the lease agreement. Your affiant asserts that within the 
nnoft 
Edwards residence and within the white shed to which Edwards has access and in Edward's 
vehicle, a grey 2000 Audi vehicle (License Plate # 054 MNZ), there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
The controlled substance methamphetamine, together with 
methamphetamine laboratory equipment (glassware, ephedrine, red 
phosphorous and iodine); and solvents and other chemicals used in 
the production of methamphetamine (coleman fuel, red-devil lye, 
and sulphuric acid); and records, notes, and papers related to the 
production or manufacturing of methamphetamine; and drug 
paraphernalia. 
and that said property or evidence is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed, is being 
possessed with a purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense, 
and/or consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the 
illegal conduct. 
I believe that the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and Unlawful 
Production\Manufacture of Methamphetamine, and that said offenses constitute felonies under 
the laws of the State of Utah. The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a search warrant 
are as follows: 
1. Commander Millett has been a peace officer in excess of fourteen years. He is 
currently assigned to the Iron/Garflied Narcotics Task Force and previously spent 
approximately 2 54 years with the task force from 1997-2000. Commander Millett 
has attended training classes related to the detection and investigation of narcotics 
and the production of methamphetamine. Commander Millett is a graduate of the 
i 
United States Drug Enforcement Agency's school on clandestine laboratory 
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investigation and the Clandestine Laboratory Investigators Academy clandestine 
laboratory school. These two training academies teach, among other narcotics 
investigation skills, law enforcement agents to detect the ingredients, precursors, 
and "cooking" methods of manufacturing methamphetamine. Commander 
Millett, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and Commander with the 
Iron/Garfield Narcotics Task Force, has almost daily contact with 
methamphetamine, methamphetamine users, and/or methamphetamine laboratory 
equipment or supplies. 
Commander Millett has received information, from a confidential informant, that 
a methamphetamine lab is in operation at the John Edwards residence. The 
confidential informant has worked with the task force on previous occasions and 
has provided reliable information that led to the arrest of a particular suspect the 
task force had been monitoring. This arrest occurred in the latter part of 2003. 
Specifically, the confidential informant conducted two (2) "controlled buys" 
wherein the informant was wired with an electronic transmitting device and given 
task force buy money to complete the transactions. The informant arranged the 
transactions and then followed through under the surveillance and supervision of 
the task force agents. Each time the information provided by the informant 
proved reliable and methamphetamine was purchased from the suspect. 
The confidential informant asserts that he met John Edwards through other known 
drug user? and has known Mr. Edwards for a couple of months. The informant 
asserts that he and Mr. Edwards are associated with a group called the 
3 
00 
"Peckerwoods", a white supremacist group, and have built a relationship of trust 
through this association. 
4. The confidential informant has been reporting for approximately three (3) weeks 
that John Edwards is manufacturing methamphetamine from his apartment located 
at the address described above. The informant stated that the informant has 
viewed phosphorous, ephedrine, iodine, glassware and other items that are 
consistent with methamphetamine production. The informant stated that he has 
helped John Edwards weigh and package the finished product, methamphetamine, 
for sale and distribution. 
5. Today, April 7, 2004, at approximately 3:00 p.m. the informant stated that he was 
in the John Edwards residence and viewed John Edwards in the process of 
cooking methamphetamine. Specifically, the informant reported that Edwards 
was mixing chemicals (ephedrine, phosphorous, and iodine) in a flask which was 
sitting upon an electric burner. This information was received by your affiant at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. 
6. Your affiant asserts that John Edwards has the chemicals and laboratory 
equipment to produce the controlled substance, methamphetamine and that the 
above described actions are consistent with one in the process of producing 
methamphetamine. Further, your affiant asserts that Edwards was and still may be 
in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine based upon the information 
provided herein. Your affiant asserts that the process, depending upon the 
I 
cooking method used, can take up to ten hours. The informant told your affiant 
4 
that it usually takes Mr. Edwards about ten hours to cook a batch of 
methamphetamine. 
7. The informant stated that Mr. Edwards uses the white shed behind the residence to 
store chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. In addition, the 
informant stated that Mr. Edwards will often leave his residence in a grey 2000 
Audi, registered to Natalie Muir (wife of John Edwards), with the finished 
product, methamphetamine. In your affiants training and experience with 
methamphetamine production and distribution it is common for suspects to store 
chemicals and laboratory equipment along with finished product in storage sheds 
and vehicles. 
8. Your affiant requests that this warrant be authorized for nighttime service as your 
affiant would like to search the residence prior to the cooking process being 
completed. In addition, the finished product could be moved away from the 
residence prior to your affiant being able to serve the warrant should the warrant 
be authorized for daytime service only. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said 
items set forth herein and located within the John Edwards residence, the above-described white 
storage shed, and the grey 2000Audi vehicle located in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah, 
and being more particularly described herein. 
Your affiant further requests that said Search Warrant be served, in daytime or nighttime 
with the requirement that law enforcement officers knock or announce their presence prior to 
serving the Search Warrant. 
5 
Dated this *J day of April, 2004 
Commander Keith Millett, affiant 
Iron Garfield County Task Force 
M. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ? ' day of April, 2004 at the hour of ? ; 6 ~ / 
p.m. 
'G. Mfchaei%es#all 
District Court Judge 
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Exhibit C 
SCOTT GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Fax: (435) 586-2737 
DEC 2 8 2004 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY J 
DEPUTY CLERK. J' 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN EDWARDS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR LIMIT 
Criminal No. 041500206 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on December 10,2004, for purposes 
of a suppression hearing, and both parties having submitted briefs on the suppression issues, and the 
Court having listened to testimony from witnesses for both parties, and oral argument having been 
made, and the matter having been submitted to the Court, the Court now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the defense has the burden of establishing that the confidential 
informant was acting as a government agent. 
2. The Court finds that the defense has not presented sufficient evidence to believe that 
the confidential informant was acting as a government agent. 
3. The Court finds that the confidential informant was not a government agent but, 
rather, was a private citizen for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
4. The Court finds that because the confidential informant was not acting as a 
government agent during the contested search on April 7, 2004, the Fourth Amendment has nof 
application to that search, and, therefore, the search was not illegal or invalid. 
5. The Court finds that there were three deficiencies in the search warrant presented for 
the judge's signature on April 7, 2004, to wit: 
A. The search warrant indicated that the confidential informant had conducted 
two (2) previous controlled buys with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force. However, 
the Court only heard testimony regarding one (1) previous controlled buy by the confidential 
informant. 
B. The search warrant failed to indicate why the confidential informant was 
cooperating with the Iron/Garfield Counties Narcotics Task Force or what promises had been made 
to the confidential informant in exchange for his assistance. The Court finds that the confidential 
informant was promised that, in exchange for information regarding substance abuse in Iron County, 
the confidential informant may have a probation violation dismissed against him. 
C. The search warrant failed to mention any independent surveillance that had 
been done by Commander Keith Millett to corroborate the confidential informant's information 
about the Defendant conducting a methamphetamine lab in his residence. 
6. The Court finds that the deficiencies in the search warrant would not have changed 
the Court's decision in finding probable cause to conduct the search. Therefore, the Court finds that 
the search warrant ultimately obtained by the Task Force on April 7, 2004, is valid and upheld. 
7. The Court finds that there was sufficient corroboration by the confidential informant 
and law enforcement to uphold the search warrant. Specifically, the confidential informant and 
Commander Millett had several conversations in the three (3) weeks prior to the date that the 
Defendant was arrested. The Court finds that, during that time, the confidential informant kept 
Commander Millett apprised of the Defendant's activities and the fact that he had laboratory 
equipment in his home and was in the process of preparing to cook methamphetamine. 
8. Additionally, the Court finds substantial corroboration for the search warrant as it 
relates to the issue of reliability contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the search warrant. The Court 
finds that the confidential informant had previously participated in a controlled buy with the Task 
Force which resulted in the arrest and prosecution of a particular defendant. 
9. The Court does not find, as a matter of law, that the Defendant was entrapped in this 
particular case. However, the Court does find that there is sufficient evidence to allow the issue of 
entrapment to be presented to the jury in the form of a jury instruction. 
ORDER 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following order: 
1. The confidential informant was not acting as a government agent during his entry of 
the Defendant's residence on April 7, 2004, and, therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
2. Despite certain deficiencies in the search warrant, those deficiencies were incidental 
and would not have changed the Court's decision as to probable cause; therefore, the search warrant 
is valid and upheld. 
3. The Defendant was not entrapped into committing this offense as a matter of law. 
However, enough evidence exists to allow the Defendant to present the issue of entrapment to a jury 
as a defense. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Limit is denied. 
DATED this . day of December, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE^ HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS OR LIMIT, on this. . day of December, 2004, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for 
Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97 North Main Street, Suite 1, Cedar City, Utah 
84720. 
0^7 
Assistant 
Exhibit D 
SCOTT GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Fax: (435)586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN EDWARDS, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF CONDITIONAL PLEA OF 
GUILTY AND CERTIFICATE OF 
COUNSEL, and ORDER 
Criminal No. 041500206 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
I, JOHN EDWARDS, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that 
I understand the following facts and rights: 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am entering a conditional plea of guilty to the following crime: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
A. Possession of a Clandestine 1sl Degree Felony 5 years-life/$ 10,000 fine, 
Drug Laboratory, plus an 85% surcharge 
UCA §58-37d-4 and 
§58-37d-5(d)(e)(f) 
r2tQ 
(I/// I have received a copy of the Amended Information against me. I have read it, or had it read 
/ to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: 
POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG LABORATORY, a 
First-Degree Felony, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37d, Section 4, 
and Title 58, Chapter 37d, Section 5(d)(e)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, in that on or about April 7, 2004, in Iron County, 
State of Utah, I, John Edwards, did knowingly or intentionally 
possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in 
a clandestine laboratory operation; or did knowingly or intentionally 
possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in 
a clandestine laboratory operation; or did knowingly or intentionally 
conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; or did produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to 
produce or manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance, and in 
so doing, (a) the intended laboratory operation was to take place or 
did take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, 
church or school; (b) the clandestine laboratory operation actually 
produced any amount of methamphetamine; or (c) the intended 
clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of a 
methamphetamine base. 
I understand that by conditionally pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the 
crime listed above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the 
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court 
to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: 
I did, on or about April 7, 2004, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly or intentionally 
possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; or did knowingly or intentionally possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent 
2 
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to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; and in so doing, the intended laboratory operation 
was to take place or did take place within 500 feet of a residence. 
/ WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
/ ' / / I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
/ ^constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up 
all the following rights: 
1. Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service 
tome. 
I have not waived my right to counsel, or if I have waived my right to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and after stating the reasons for doing so on the record. 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
n
 / 
\yi understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
S\L/ understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
/ f If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is J. Bryan Jackson. My attorney and 
'\ / I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s). 
j 2. Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
If (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
3 
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3. Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my 
Y ^ attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
4. Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
5. Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
6. Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, 
I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose 
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges(s) beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror 
would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
7. Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
:-2 
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appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am givmg up my right to appeal 
my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice 
of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
8. Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory 
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my 
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
9. Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime to which 
I plead. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense 
of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty 
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
5 
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10. Plea agreement. My guilty plea(s) is/are the result of a plea agreement between myself 
and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, 
are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
In exchange for my conditional plea of guilty as set forth herein, the State of Utah has agreed 
to file an Amended Information therein charging me with Possession of a Clandestine Drug 
Laboratory, a First-Degree Felony, as opposed to the original Information which charged me with 
Possession of a Clandestine Drug Laboratory, a First-Degree Felony; Unlawful Possession of 
Methamphetamine, a Second-Degree Felony; Endangerment of a Child, a Third-Degree Felony; and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A Misdemeanor. Moreover, I understand that the State 
of Utah has agreed to recommend the preparation of a presentence investigation report to aid in my 
sentencing. Additionally, the State has agreed to allow me to enter a conditional plea of guilty with 
the understanding that I may withdraw my plea if my suppression arguments are accepted by the 
appellate court. In the event that my suppression arguments are not accepted by the appellate court, 
I understand that my plea of guilty will no longer be conditional. I also understand that in the event 
that my conditional plea is withdrawn, the State may resume prosecution for the original charges 
contained in the Information. No other promises have been made to induce me to plead guilty. 
11. Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may 
do are not binding on the judge. 
6 
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DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained 
in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
, statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. / 
I am ^ 7 y years of age. I have attended school through the / grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, mediation, or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, 
defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I must file a written motion 
or withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that for a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea(s) if I show that it 
7 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made 
after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 
35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED {L day of December, 2004. 
j 6 H N E D W ^ d § " 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for JOHN EDWARDS, the defendant above, and I know 
he/she has read the statement, or that I have read it to him/her; and I discussed it with him/her and 
believe he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements 
of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and 
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ACKSON 
efendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against JOHN EDWARDS, 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
r
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inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
j ^ ^ < ^ ^ ^ 
SCOTT GARRETT ^ 
Iron County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representation in the court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea(s) to the crime(s) set for in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
DATED this IH day of December, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
IAEL'WESTFALI> 
Enstnct Court Judge 
9 
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SCOTT GARRETT (#8687) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JOHN EDWARDS, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
) Criminal No. 041500206 
I Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The Defendant, JOHN EDWARDS, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of 
POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG LABORATORY, a First-Degree Felony, on 
December 14, 2004, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and 
thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and after said report 
was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for sentencing 
on January 18, 2005, and the Defendant, JOHN EDWARDS, having appeared before the Court in 
person together with his attorney of record J. Bryan Jackson, and the State of Utah having appeared 
i 
by and through Iron County Attorney Scott Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the presentence 
investigation report and the file in detail, and having further heard statements from all parties and 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, JOHN 
EDWARDS, has been convicted of the offense of POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG 
LABORATORY, a First-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had 
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the 
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged 
and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, JOHN 
EDWARDS, and pursuant to his conviction of POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG 
LABORATORY, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah 
State Prison for a period of five (5) years to life, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody 
of the Utah State Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN EDWARDS, and pursuant to his 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG LABORATORY, a First-Degree 
Felony, a First-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount of five thousand dollars 
($5,000), ptes an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN EDWARDS, and pursuant to his 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE DRUG LABORATORY, a First-Degree 
Felony, shall pay a court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25). 
2 -
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, JOHN EDWARDS, and 
deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and 
confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this .dayof /^^/lUCdsCx ,2005. 
/BY THE (58URT: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. John Edwards, Criminal 
No. 041500206, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
n s? th C\ -
this <y ' l day of yf^—~~ 2 0 0 5 ' 
( S E A L ) 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
^*>/r B y : _ 
Deputy District Co 
3 -
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, on this & ' day of January, 
2005, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97 
North Main Street, Suite 1, Cedar City, UT 84720. 
>(/}\QA < # t _ _ 
Assistant 
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